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I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States maintains a stern policy when it comes to the
payment of ransom for U.S. citizens who have been kidnapped: no
concessions. 1 The policies of the United States government denies
hostage-takers the benefit of obtaining ransom, prisoner releases and
exchanges, policy changes, or other governmental concessions. 2
Terrorist organizations maintain a ubiquitous presence in the Middle
East, Africa, Asia, and South America.3 The Middle East is the epicenter
of the world’s most powerful and relentless terrorist organizations that
abide by no rules and recognize no boundaries in their ruthless pursuit to
instill fear and assert their dominance in the regions they occupy.
Aspirations of the magnitude 4 possessed by such groups do not come
easy or cheap; 5 they materialize by way of violence, extortion, and sheer
brutal force. 6 Significantly, the actions necessary to bring these plans to
fruition require substantial financial resources.7
1

Press Release, Richard Boucher, U.S. Department of State, International Terrorism:
American Hostages (Feb. 20, 2002), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/8190.html.
2
Id.
3
Organised Maritime Piracy and Related Kidnapping for Ransom, at 27 ¶ 64, FATF
Report (July 2011) [hereinafter FATF KFR Report]. “The Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) interdependent inter-governmental body that develops and promotes policies to
protect the global financial system against money laundering and terrorist financing.”
4
Eric Schmitt and David D. Kirkpatrick, Islamic State Sprouting Limbs Beyond its
Base, N.Y. Times, February 14, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/world/
middleeast/islamic-state-sprouting-limbs-beyond-mideast.html?hp&action=click&
pgtype=Homepage&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=topnews&_r=0.
5
Tony Capaccio, Pentagon Says Islamic Fight Costs $ 7.6 Million/Day, Bloomberg,
October 10, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-10/pentagon-says-islamicstate-fight-costs-7-6-million-day.html. Pentagon officials estimate the top end of the
estimate to be $ 10 million daily, bringing the total cost to $ 425 million from August 2,
2014 to October 2, 2014.
6
See e.g., Jordan pilot hostage Moaz al-Kasasbeh ‘burned alive,’ BBC, February 3,
2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31121160
7
Capaccio, supra note 6. But see David S. Cohen, Remarks at the Center for a New
American Security: Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing (March 4, 2014),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2308.aspx. Although many
regional operations require substantial funding, smaller and more isolated individual
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Many terrorist organizations receive significant sums of money from
interested donors; others engage in criminal activities such as illegal
merchandising and narcotics trafficking. 8 But amongst the mostpublicized and widely condemned financing methods utilized by Middle
Eastern terrorist groups is the abduction and the extortion of Western
citizens in order to gain political concessions9 or ransom payments in
exchange for their safe release. 10
The devastating capabilities of terrorist organizations’ lean operating
models are compounded by the growing trend of multimillion dollar
ransom payments. 11 The September 11, 2001 terror attack on the World
Trade Centers that took the lives of 2,973 innocent civilians required
$500,000 to coordinate the operation; an amount that one ransom
payment covers many times over.12 The payment of ransoms compared
to other revenue-generating activities is becoming a primary source for
many terrorist organizations for the obvious reason that “they make far
more revenue than it costs to execute.” 13 Since the beginning of 2014, the
Islamic State in Iraq and Levant, or “ISIL,” has generated over $20
million in revenue from hostage ransom payments. 14 Smaller groups
such as Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Magrheb (“AQIM”) “have
been estimated to have collected at least $65 million in ransom payments
since 2005.” 15
Thus the question becomes, who is paying these exorbitant sums
directly to terrorist organizations? That inquiry is not one so easily
answered. 16 Under various United Nations Security Resolutions, all
Member States are unequivocally forbidden to, directly or indirectly,
attacks can cost as little as $4,200 to bomb certain strategic targets, e.g., a UPS plane.
The Boston Marathon bombings, for example, required a mere $500 to carry out.
8
See Christopher C. Harmon, Terrorism Today 73-75 (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter
Terrorism Today].
9
See e.g., FATF KFR Report, supra note 4, at 25 ¶ 59.
10
Press Release, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, UK welcomes UN Resolution on
Terrorist Kidnap for Ransom (January 27, 2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
uk-welcomes-un-resolution-on-terrorist-kidnap-for-ransom [hereinafter UK Resolution on
Terrorist KFR].
11
FATF KFR Report, supra note 4, at 31 ¶ 75.
12
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 169
(W.W. Norton & Company 2004), http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911
Report.pdf.
13
Terrorism Today, supra note 9, at 75.
14
Press Release, The White House, Office of the Secretary of the Press Josh Earnest
(October 23, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/10/23/pressbriefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-10232014.
15
FATF KFR Report, supra note 4, at 26 ¶ 60.
16
See id. at ¶ 61.
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make ransom payments. 17 As leaders of the adoption of the pertinent
resolutions, 18 the United States and the United Kingdom firmly maintain
a “no-concessions” policy and have staunchly refused to make ransom
payments or political concessions. 19 However, other countries, such as
France, Italy, Spain, and Germany, have reportedly paid ransoms
estimated to total $120 million over the last decade, 20 although they deny
having ever done so. 21 The proceeds are allocated to conduct vital
operations such as paying salaries to jihadists, bribing local
governmental officials, 22 conducting training, procuring weapons,
recruiting efforts, distributing propaganda, and providing financial
support to affiliate branches of like-minded jihadi terrorist groups. 23
This Note discusses methods and techniques utilized by various
organization to obtain the funds necessary for their ongoing operations.
Additionally, this note emphasizes the impact and ramifications of
ongoing violations of the UN Security Council Resolutions forbidding
the payment of ransoms to terrorist organizations by European countries
and suggests a resolution to foreclose a substantial source of terrorist
financing by rallying the international community to publicly condemn
and bring to a halt violations of those Resolutions that forbid such
payments from being made.

II.

THE RISE OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM AND POLITICAL
CONCESSIONS

Kidnapping for Ransom (“KFR”) is not a particularly sophisticated
nor innovative technique. In fact, examples of KFR date back to biblical
times. 24 Although kidnapping in and of itself is a well-rooted historical
practice, it has taken a new dimension in the past 15 years - extremist
17

See e.g., S.C. Res. 1904, P2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1904 (Dec. 17, 2009).
Section IV, infra.
19
Rukmini Callimachi, Before Killing James Foley, ISIS Demanded Ransom from
U.S., N.Y. Times, August 20, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/21/world/
middleeast/isis-pressed-for-ransom-before-killing-james-foley.html?_r=0.
20
David S. Cohen, Remarks at Chatham House: Kidnapping for Ransom: The
Growing Terrorist Financing Challenge (October 6, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1726.aspx [hereinafter Chatham House Press
Release].
21
Rukmini Callimachi, Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror, N.Y.
Times, July 29, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransomingcitizens-europe-becomes-Al-Qaedas-patron.html [hereinafter Bankrolling Qaeda Terror].
22
FATF KFR Report, supra note 4, at 26 ¶ 59.
23
Jimmy Gurule, Unfunding Terror: The Legal Response to the Financing of Global
Terrorism 3 (2008) [hereinafter Unfunding Terror].
24
Exodus 21:16; see also Deuteronomy 24:7.
18
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jihadi groups and the countries that pay ransoms have created a market
for Western nationals in their pursuit to profit by KFR. 25
In 2003, $200,000 was the average amount sought for the release of
kidnapped Western nationals.26 Now, the amount sought, and paid, can
reach up to $10 million for a single hostage. 27 From 2010 to 2011 alone,
there was a 20% increase in the price that hostage-takers could obtain for
their organizations. 28 This trend is far-reaching. In a 2010 incident,
AQIM demanded €70 million for the release of four French citizens that
were taken hostage in Niger. 29 AQIM’s annual budget is estimated to be
€15 million, 30 a ransom payment amounting to a fraction of the amounts
typically demanded is enough to fund their activities for a period of time
extending far in the future. 31 The payment of such ransoms also have
undoubtedly contributed to ISIL’s unprecedented $200 million dollar
demand for the release of two Japanese hostages. 32
In a 2012 letter to an Al-Qaeda affiliate, Bin Laden’s former
secretary wrote that spoils from ransom accounted for over half of his
budget. 33 And groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(“AQAP”) derive almost their entire budget from KFR. 34 In one specific
instance, a $10 million ransom was paid to the Taliban in Afghanistan
for the release of 21 hostages. 35 The spoils were declared a “God-sent
opportunity” by a Taliban leader who further claimed that prior to
Operation Nusrat—which lead to the death of four British soldiers—the
group “hardly had any funds to carry out such a major offence” but
“[t]hanks to the ransom payments, however, the operation proceeded
25

Chatham House Press Release, supra note 21. The Press Release notes that KFR has
now become one of the most important sources of income for terrorist organizations as
state sponsorship is on the decline. Groups such as AQIM sometimes coordinate with
local criminals to take foreign nationals and demand their governments pay huge ransoms
or make other political concessions for their release, thereby making it more difficult to
determine who is ultimately responsible for the physical perpetration of the abductions.
26
Bankrolling Qaeda Terror, supra note 22.
27
Id.
28
See Chatham House Press Release, supra note 21.
29
Id.
30
FATF KFR Report, supra note 4, at 28 ¶ 65.
31
See e.g., Id.
32
Heather Saul, Isis Threatens to Kill Two Japanese Hostages Unless Government
Pays $200 Million Ransom, The Independent, January 20, 2015, http://www.independent.
co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-threatens-to-kill-two-japanese-hostages-unless-gover
nment-pays-200m-ransom-9989256.html.
33
Bankrolling Qaeda Terror, supra note 22.
34
See Chatham House Press Release, supra note 21.
35
Massoud Ansari, Taliban Use Hostage to Fund UK Blitz, The Telegraph, October
15, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1566163/Taliban-use-hostagecash-to-fund-UK-blitz.html?mobile=basic [hereinafter Ransom Payments Fund UK
Blitz].
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with full vigor.” 36 The Taliban leader also stated that the ransom
provided the group with enough financial resources to wage a war for
another year. 37Other extremist groups relying on KFR as a primary
financing mechanism include al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and Ansaru. 38

III.

OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS

Beginning with the 1990’s and through the turn of the millennium,
technological advancements were the impetus for globalization and
instantaneous connectivity for terrorist organizations. Satellite
communication, the internet, social media, and media hosting services
have provided terrorist organizations the opportunity to develop their
propaganda campaigns and recruitment efforts in an elaborate and costeffective manner. 39 As KFR becomes a growing means of funding the
half of the battle taking place in the battlefield of the media, 40 countries
that pay substantial ransoms are perpetuating the terrorist machine.41
ISIL and its affiliates reportedly produce over 90,000 tweets42 a day,
causing global leaders to undertake a new global effort to stymie the
group’s media clout, a task that has proven challenging to global
leaders. 43 The expansive online presence has attracted the attention of not
only regional, but global jihadists who sympathize with ISIL in the
virtual and physical realm. 44

36

Id.
Id.
38
David S. Cohen, Remarks at the Center for a New American Security: Confronting
New Threats in Terrorist Financing (March 4, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Pages/jl2308.aspx [hereinafter New American Security Press
Release].
39
Unfunding Terror, supra note 24, at 25.
40
Id. As-Sahab, the media branch of Al-Qaeda is charged with the production and
release of graphic recruitment and propaganda videos of beheadings, suicide bombings,
and other terrorist attacks.
41
Id. at 21.
42
Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/tweet. “Tweet” is defined as
“a very short message posted on the Twitter website: the message may include text,
keywords, mentions of specific users, links to websites, and links to images or videos on
a website.”
43
Eric Schmitt, U.S Intensifies Effort to Blunt ISIS’ Message, N.Y. Times, February
16, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/17/world/middleeast/us-intensifies-effort-toblunt-isis-message.html?_r=0 [hereinafter ISIS’ Twitter Message].
44
Id.
37
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A.
Advancements in technology reduce risks for terrorist
entities negotiating for ransom
Despite the fact that almost every banking institution maintains nonphysical means for transferring money, 45 additional international efforts
in hindering the use of financial systems 46 to transfer funds to terrorist
organizations have substantially frustrated terrorist groups’ efforts in
utilizing banking services to obtain proceeds gained from KFR. 47 Given
these restrictions, ideally, terrorist organizations are left with the risky
maneuver of making hand-to-hand cash tradeoffs that can result in their
capture. 48 However, one 2011 KFR scenario recounted by a released
hostage details the efficient and sophisticated techniques utilized by
terrorist organizations in order to obtain their ransom payments while
eluding the inherent dangers of a physical cash deal. 49 An Italian tourist,
Mariasandra Mariana, was abducted by Al-Qaeda, and while negotiating
with the Italian government, her captors drove for days on “what
appeared to be a well delineated route” littered with hidden gas cans and
spare tires that were pinpointed on a GPS. 50 Infrequent satellite phone
calls were made to the Italian government during her 14-month captivity
and Mariana was forced to record video messages showing her
surrounded by armed captors. 51
ISIS recently released a video using “a relatively sophisticated
surveillance drone” to coordinate its military activities.52 Some
45
S.C. Resolution 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (September 28, 2001). Resolution
1373 was adopted for the purpose of establishing the FATF and the creating criteria and
procedures necessary to freeze the assets identified as belonging to terrorist
organizations.
46
But see, FATF KFR Report, supra note 4, at 33 ¶ 83. The FATF report discloses the
use of formal financial institutions in at least some KFR cases. The intentional use of
such institutions is utilized as a means of tracing the remittances so as to gain a better
understanding of who, and how, the money is ultimately infused into terrorist
organization’s operations.
47
S.C. Resolution 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (September 28, 2001).
48
See FATF KFR Report, supra note 4, at 33 ¶ 87.
49
Bankrolling Qaeda Terror, supra note 22.
50
Id.
51
Id. 11 former hostages have confirmed the employment of similar tactics in Algeria,
Mali, Niger, Syria and Yemen. The video messages were distributed online and in the
media and resulted in rallies across Europe for the release of Mariana and two other
Spanish hostages. It was reported that the demand for her release was $ 8 million- $10
million USD. This figure is nearly double than the reported average in the Chatham
House Press Release, supra note 21.
52
Peter Bergen and Emily Schneider, Now ISIS has drones?, CNN, August 25, 2014,
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/24/opinion/bergen-schneider-drones-isis/. ISIS is not a
first to utilize drone technology, Israel shot down a Hamas-piloted drone- one which
possesses armed capabilities.
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organizations, such as Hamas, possess drones that cost as much as
$200,000 that are utilized for surveillance and attack purposes.53 The
rapid proliferation of affordable mobile surveillance and communication
techniques illuminates the efficiency every dollar terrorist organizations
obtain is used in furtherance of its extremist manifesto to instill fear and
oppress those who do not accept their views.54

B.
Media: Compounding public pressure and affordable
recruiting
Prior to the turn of the 21st century, grassroots terrorist organizations
were limited in their influence and spreading of propaganda to leafleting
and local media efforts such as radio, television, and newspapers.55
However, the explosive growth of the internet, and more specifically,
mobile internet access, has fueled ISIL’s attack on Western values and
has placed immense pressure on the U.S. and U.K.’s “no concessions”
policies. 56 Although the media is a two-way street that can be utilized by
both the hostage-takers and governmental authorities, the reactionary
nature of the latter often fails to diminish the harm caused by the
former. 57
In addition to serving as a platform to increase public pressure on
countries that make no concessions, the internet has been an extremely
cost-effective way to recruit combatants 58 and spread public awareness
of their purpose. 59 ISIS has taken its jihad online by establishing dozens
of Twitter accounts 60 and posting YouTube videos in seven languages;
when one account gets suspended by officials, a dozen more appear in its
place. 61 Many experts are of the belief that the appeal of the extremist
Islamist movement in the Middle East will continue to grow because of
53

Id.
Marc Rogers, The Psychology of Cyber-Terrorism 80-81 (Andrew Silke ed.,
Terrorists, Victims, and Society 2003) (2003).
55
Terrorism Today, supra note 9, at 47-8. Newspapers, leafleting, and radio were the
most commonly resorted to techniques for distributing propaganda. However, the
ubiquity of the internet related media outlets has supplanted—although not replaced—the
aforementioned sources.
56
Brian Knowlton, Digital War Takes Shape on Websites Over ISIS, N.Y. Times,
September 26, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/world/middleeast/us-vividlyrebuts-isis-propaganda-on-arab-social-media.html.
57
Linda N. Deitch, Comment, Breaking News: Proposing A Pooling Requirement for
Media Coverage of Live Hostage Situations, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 243, 255 (1999)
58
Scott Shane & Ben Hubbard, ISIS Displaying a Deft Command of Varied Media,
N.Y. Times, August 30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/31/world/middleeast/
isis-displaying-a-deft-command-of-varied-media.html.
59
FATF KFR Report, supra note 4, at 28 ¶ 65.
60
See ISIS’ Twitter Message, supra note 44.
61
Id.
54
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its popular appeal to the economically impoverished regions where ISIL
and other extremist groups target their recruitment efforts.62 “The
availability of online materials affords extremist groups, such as Al
Qaida and its affiliates, greater access than ever before to vulnerable
individuals in country [sic] and provides a wide reaching platform for
their extremist messages.” 63The group’s online recruitment efforts have
not bolstered their numbers to an estimated 31,500 fighters64 including
over 200 Americans.

IV.

COMBATTING HOSTAGE TAKING GROUPS: THE RESPONSE OF
PAYMENT OR THE RESPONSE OF FORCE

A.
The U.S and the U.K.’s role as countries that pay with
force
“No-concessions” does not mean “no-help.” 65 The U.S. and the U.K.
defy those terrorist organizations that seek to disgrace those countries
that firmly maintain “no-concessions” policies by forcing captives to
denounce their governments for their policies in rejecting to negotiate for
their release. 66 In fact, both countries invest millions of dollars and risk
the lives of special operatives by conducting Special Forces rescue
missions. 67
Despite the staunchly-honored no concessions policy, ISIL
demanded a $132 million ransom payment for the release of American
hostage James Foley. 68 The ransom was not paid and Foley’s demise was
a direct result of the fact. 69 Notwithstanding the tragic outcome, there is
62

Jae-myong Koh, Suppressing Terrorism Financing and Money Laundering 7 (2006).
Press Release, Using International Partnerships To Tackle The Threat Of Global
Terrorism, James Brokenshire’s Special Address (June 25, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/
government/speeches/using-international-partnerships-to-tackle-the-threat-of-globalterrorism.
64
Lucy Westscott, CIA Report ISIS Has Up to 31,500 Fighters, Newsweek, September
12, 2014, http://www.newsweek.com/cia-reports-isis-has-31500-fighters-270122. CIA
Spokesman Ryan Trapani stated that the new total, up from the previous 10,000 estimate,
is due to stronger recruitment efforts following a bout of publicized battlefield success.
The propaganda is primarily targeting young individuals across the U.S., the European
Union, and the Middle East.
65
Bankrolling Qaeda Terror, supra note 22.
66
Id.
67
David S. Cohen, Remarks Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence
at The Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, Attacking ISIL’s Financial
Foundation (October 23, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/
Pages/jl2672.aspx [hereinafter Carnegie Press Release].
68
Callimachi, supra note 20.
69
Id.
63
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evidence that remaining faithful to the “no-concessions” policy has
directly resulted in a drastic decrease in the number of U.S. and U.K.
citizens that are targets of KFR orientated organizations.70 British and
American officials have repeatedly and steadfastly asserted that their noconcessions policies play a major role in preventing British and
American citizens from being targeted as victims for the exchange of
ransom. 71

B.

Europe’s role as countries that pay

“[K]idnapping for ransom has become today’s most significant
source of terrorist financing because it has proven itself a frighteningly
successful tactic.” 72 This is largely due to the successful international
effort to deprive jihadi militants of the benefits derived from more
“traditional” sources of revenue, such as drug sales and illegal trading. 73
Despite this inescapable fact learned from past experience, European
countries have made ransom payments for the release of their nationals
on more than one occasion, and deny ever having done so. 74 The FATF’s
investigative report has revealed, in fact, that many European countries
have so systemically adopted the practice of paying ransoms that they
have allocated a portion of their annual budget to such matters.75 The
payment of such ransoms are difficult, if not impossible, to trace because
they are often conducted on a solely cash basis 76 and the governments of
paying countries disguise the payments as being used for “humanitarian
aid” purposes. 77 As discussed below, the effect of these disguised
payments shrouds the paying countries with a veil of impunity as they
accede to terrorist demands for the payment of ransom in exchange for
their capture citizens. 78

70

Chatham House Press Release, supra note 21.
Id.
72
Carnegie Press Release, supra note 68.
73
FATF KFR Report, supra note 4, at 46 Annex Case Study #2.
74
Carol Hills, They’ll Never Admit it, but Many Countries Pay Ransoms to Get Their
Hostages Back, Public Radio International, http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-08-21/theyllnever-admit-it-many-countries-pay-ransoms-get-their-hostages-back.
75
FATF KFR Report, supra note 4, at 35 ¶ 89; see also New American Security Press
Release, supra note 39.
76
FATF KFR Report, supra note 4, at 33 ¶ 87.
77
Bankrolling Qaeda Terror, supra note 21. The same year that some Swiss hostages
were released, Swiss lawmakers voted on a national budget with an increased line for
humanitarian aid to Mali. The concealment of the payments in this way masks the
transactions from the international arena, permitting the countries to maintain their
payment policies with impunity.
78
See infra sec. V.
71
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LEGAL AND PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES SURROUNDING THE
PAYMENT OF RANSOM TO TERRORIST GROUPS

A.

International Response to Taking of Hostages

In response to the Iranian Hostage Crisis, 79 the United Nations
(“U.N.”) enacted the International Convention against the Taking of
Hostages. 80 The Convention classifies KFR as not merely a “predicate
offense to terrorism-related crimes, but is itself a type of terrorism.” 81
The Convention laid down the framework for the international
community to establish offensive measures in combatting hostage-taking
by codifying anti-KFR laws in various cooperating countries across the
globe that cooperate in the prevention of hostage-takings. 82 Following
the adoption of the Convention, the U.N. Security Council took further
subsequent remedial measures in an effort to thwart the growing trend of
terrorist organizations utilizing KFR methods by adopting a plethora of
Resolutions. 83 Significantly, the U.N. Security Council passed
Resolutions 1904, 2133, and 2170 with the objective of combatting the
payment of ransoms, making political concessions, or prisoner swaps in
exchange for hostages. 84

B.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1904 (2009)

After reiterating its “unequivocal condemnation” of Al-Qaeda’s
“ongoing and multiple criminal terrorist acts,” the U.N. unanimously
adopted Resolution 1904. 85 The council expressed concern over the
increased number of KFR scenarios in the Middle East and Africa and
permitted Member States to freeze the assets of organizations known to
engage in KFR. 86 In doing so, the Council stressed that “terrorism can
79

Iranian Hostage Crisis Fast Facts, CNN Library, http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/15/
world/meast/iran-hostage-crisis-fast-facts/. In 1979, 52 U.S. Citizens were held hostage
for 444 days, prompting the adoption of the U.N. International Convention against the
Taking of Hostages in the same year, infra note 81 and accompanying text.
80
U.N. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205. This was a direct response to the Iranian hostage
crisis.
81
Global Counterterrorism Forum, Algiers Memorandum on Good Practices
Preventing and Denying the Benefits of Kidnapping for Ransom by Terrorists.
https://www.thegctf.org/documents/10162/36031/Algiers+Memorandum+on+Good+Prac
tices+on+Preventing+and+Denying+the+Benefits+of+KFR+by+Terrorists-English.
82
U.N. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205.
83
See generally, infra notes 86-99.
84
See id.
85
S.C. Res. 1904, P2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1904 (Dec. 17, 2009).
86
Id.
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only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach involving
the active participation and collaboration of all States” to impede and
impair the terrorist threat.87
Resolution 1904 expressly identifies the conveyance of ransom
payments to individuals listed on the Security Council Resolution 1267
sanctions list 88 as an act that requires the assets of any person, entity, or
state paying ransom to a terrorist organization to be frozen. 89 Therefore,
under a plain reading of Resolution 1904, even a member state’s
payment of a ransom to any terrorist groups, even for the release of their
own nationals, requires an asset freeze because such a payment would be
providing “financial assets or economic resources” to a terrorist
organization. 90

C.

United Nations Security Resolution 2133 (2014)

In the years following Resolution 1904, the Security Council
expressed further concern over the “increase in incidents of kidnapping
and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups with the aim of raising
funds, or gaining political concessions” and that “the payment of
ransoms to terrorists fund future kidnappings and hostage-takings which
creates more victims and perpetuates the problem.” 91 The Security
Council further expressed its determination to secure the safe release of
hostages without ransom payments or political concessions.92 The
mechanism by which the Resolution intends to achieve this objective is
for “all Member States to cooperate closely during incidents of
kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups” in order
“to prevent terrorists from benefiting directly or indirectly from ransom

87

Id.
S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999). Resolution 1267 is a
comprehensive resolution that has been utilized to serve as a list of terrorist organizations
and entities, whether state or private, who provide material support to terrorist
organization, and upon which sanctions have been imposed. The sanctions imposed by
the 1267 list is further strengthened by subsequent Resolutions such as Resolution 1904.
Any member is free to unilaterally add any state, person, or entity to the Consolidated
List of sanctions.
89
S.C. Res. 1904, P1(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1904 (Dec. 17, 2009)
90
Id.
91
S.C. Res. 2133, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2133 (January 27, 2014).
92
Id. The Security Council also noted the strong condemnation of KFR by the much
more expansive and encompassing Final Document of the sixteenth Summit of the Heads
of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement. See also NAM
2012/Doc.1/Rev.2 (August 12-13, 2012), available at, http://www.iranwatch.org/
sites/default/files/nam-iransummitfinaldocument-083112.pdf.
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payments or from political concessions and to secure the safe release of
hostages.” 93

D.

U.N. Resolution 2170 (2014)

In 2014, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2170 94 in response
to the terrorist activities of ISIL. Essentially, the Resolution is an
affirmance of Resolutions 1904 and 2133 and their condemnation of the
payment of ransoms or political concessions in exchange for the release
of hostages. 95 The council characterizes ISIL’s—and its affiliates’—
”gross, systemic, and widespread abuse of human rights” by kidnapping
civilians of specific nationality to raise funds in exchange for their
release. 96 The Council also stressed that “terrorism can only be defeated
by a sustained and comprehensive approach involving the active
participation and collaboration of all States, and international and
regional organizations to impede, impair, isolate and incapacitate the
terrorist threat. 97 The Security Council’s repeated condemnation98 of
paying ransoms or making political concessions illuminates the
repugnancy of the elaborate schemes European countries undertake to
convey large cash payments to terrorist organizations.99 Significantly, the
Resolution reaffirms Resolution 1373 in that it “prohibit[s] their
nationals or any persons and entities within their territories form making
nay funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other
related serves available” to any person or entity that has, or might,
participate in acts of terrorism. 100 Furthermore, the resolution explicitly
prohibits the payment of ransoms to any individual or group on the AlQaida Sanctions List 101 and calls for a freeze of the remitting parties
assets, “regardless of how or by whom the ransom is paid.” 102 Yet,
absent from every major resolution is a provision on how to deal with
Member States that fail to live up to the binding obligations that Title VII
of the U.N. Charter imposes on them to not make those payments.
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S.C. Res. 2133, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2133 (January 27, 2014).
S.C. Res. 2170, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2170 (August 15, 2014). Resolution 2170 was
unanimously adopted and is binding on all Member States through Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Bankrolling Qaeda Terror, supra note 22.
100
S.C. Res. 2170, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2170 (August 15, 2014).
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S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).
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S.C. Res. 2170, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2170 (August 15, 2014).
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ANALYSIS

A.
European countries have violated UN Security Resolutions
and created a market for Western civilian hostages
European countries’ payments of substantial ransoms fuels and
perpetuates the sustainability of the current models utilized by hostagetaking terrorist organizations 103 and has made their citizens into a
profitable market. 104 The profits from the steady market they have
created fund the organizations that threaten the national security of the
US, Europe, as well as the military operatives engaged in the respective
territories occupied by these groups.105
By European nations remitting cash for KFR payments, 106 the
countries directly contravene the plain language of Resolution 1904
wherein it forbids the provision of “financial assets or economic
resources.” 107 In the context which the Resolution is oriented to
address, 108 such payments would typically result in the payee’s assets
being frozen. 109 However, it poses a novel and unaddressed issue for
U.N. Security Council leaders when allied countries such as France,
Spain, Switzerland, Austria, and Italy are the states paying ransoms.
Further, the lack of publicized tangible evidence110 that the
aforementioned countries are, in fact, making such payments further
compounds the problems that arise from a lack of confrontation of the
issue.
Although the aforementioned resolutions are not an express
prohibition, but rather a recognition and encouragement by the Security
Council that KFR payments are not to be made, 111 failure to abide by the
Resolutions plain meaning renders them practically meaningless.112 The
ostensible prohibition against KFR having been historically undermined
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FATF KFR Report, supra note 4, at 26 ¶ 59.
New American Security Press Release, supra note 39.
105
See e.g., Ransom Payment Funds UK Blitz, supra note 36.
106
Hills, supra note 75.
107
S.C. Res. 1904, P2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1904 (Dec. 17, 2009).
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See e.g., Bureau of Counterrorism Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations,
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. Historically, violations of the
Resolutions in this manner are committed by non-member terrorist sponsoring states such
as Pakistan. In such a situation, assets of the donor would be frozen and that individual or
entity would be added to the Resolution 1267 Sanction List.
109
S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).
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Bankrolling Qaeda Terror, supra note 22.
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S.C. Res. 2133, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2133 (January 27, 2014).
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is evidenced by the repeated condemnation of not only the act of KFR,
but the payments thereof.113
Similarly, the express objectives of Resolution 2133 are undercut by
the secretive KFR remittances in that they flatly do not “secure the safe
release of hostages without ransom payments or political
concessions.” 114 Public denial and a purposeful lack of transparency
surrounding such remittances is repugnant to the Resolution’s call for
close cooperation and information sharing following a kidnapping
incident and a ransom payment made as a result thereof. 115 In doing so,
European countries are not taking measures “to counter terrorism [that]
comply with their obligations under international law.” 116
Resolution 2170’s affirmance 117 of Resolution 2133’s objective to
foster international cooperation and a comprehensive international effort
to impair the KFR financing mechanism, European countries continue to
undermine Resolutions 1373, 1904, 2133, and 2170 by providing direct
and indirect financial support to those terrorist organizations to which the
ransom payments are made. Pursuant to the aforementioned Resolutions,
among others, this would result in the paying countries becoming the
subject of sanctions in the form of an asset freeze and placement on the
Sanction List. However, the Resolution’s silence on the treatment of
countries that are not terrorist sponsors but are responsible for the
remittances at issue leaves unaddressed on how to impose actionable and
forceful restrictions upon those parties that are paying ransoms in
contravention to the policies outline and adopted by the Security
Council.

B.
Negotiating Payment of Ransom with Kidnappers
Legitimizes their Power
Acceding to the demands of terrorist organizations by engaging in
negotiations for ransom or political concessions is a dangerous act in and
of itself. 118 For a world power to negotiate and grant the demands of

113

S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).
S.C. Res. 2133, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2133 (January 27, 2014).
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Id.
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See id.
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Hostage Negotiations With Terror Groups Like ISIS Raises Concerns, CBS News,
January 30, 2015, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/hostage-negotiations-with-terrorgroups-like-isis-raises-concerns. ISIS has realized the hostages can be used as strategic
pawns to not only add to their propaganda value, to give themselves more legitimacy -you see them now negotiating with countries directly -- but also to create tensions in
capitals of those countries that are engaged in the fight against ISIS itself.”
114

2014-15]

ALLIED PRESSURE

221

terrorist organizations legitimizes their presence as a political entity 119
and thereby solidifies their political agenda in the eyes of those located
within their geographic region. “To make deals with such entities [is] to
shame the legitimate power of elected state governments.” 120 A country’s
very willingness to engage in any form of negotiations with a terrorist
organization effectively establishes that their citizens are to be targeted
as a way of gaining negotiating leverage for any and all reasons moving
forward.

VII.

RESTORING THE MEANING OF “NO CONCESSIONS” WITH A UN
RESOLUTION

“Not to pay ransoms to terrorists is to jeopardize innocent lives. But
to pay ransoms is to help sustain terrorist groups that are dedicated to
taking many other innocent lives.” 121 Without consistent application, the
no-concessions initiative will not come to fruition and terrorist
organizations will continue to target Western civilians on the basis of
their nationality to secure another KFR. 122
Furthermore, for a world power to negotiate with terrorist
organizations on the basis of remitting a ransom payment would be to
legitimize their authority in a way that gains them notoriety and publicity
that further perpetuates their regional reign and global influence. 123 The
problem is further compounded by the organizations utilizing social
networking platforms and other forms of media to announce to the world
the concessions they have gained from a major power, consequently,
emboldening the terrorist groups and their tactics.124
Despite the already-existing Security Council Resolutions that
obliquely address the payment of ransom for civilians, there remains an
utter lack of direct acknowledgement on the matter—that countries are
still paying ransoms despite repeated affirmations of their unwillingness
to do so. 125 The United Nations must address the issue and meet it headon with a resolution that not only explicitly acknowledges the ongoing
repugnance to the aforementioned Resolutions.

119
120
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122
123
124
125

Terrorism Today, supra note 9, at 128.
Id.
Chatham House Press Release, supra note 21.
Id.
See FATF KFR Report, supra note 4, at 28 ¶ 65.
UK Resolution on Terrorist KFR, supra, note 11.
See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
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A.
A Call for Change: Draining Terrorist Group Funding
Pipelines
It is never an easy decision for a country to refuse to pay the release
for one of its citizens. Governments with “no-concessions” policies are
not cold-hearted, and do hold the safety of their nationals as being of the
utmost importance. However, for the reasons discussed in this Note, the
time is more pressing than ever; it is vital that “concession policy”
countries drain the lifeline sustaining the operations of terrorist
organizations. The average life expectancy for a small terrorist
organization is one year; 126 depriving smaller cells of their primary
financing mechanism will not only lead to their inability to raise funds
for their own activities, but it also deprives the larger commanding cells
higher up in the hierarchy from utilizing the smaller, harder to detect, and
less predictable cells to conduct the various stages of the KFR process.127
This recommendation is not without its challenges—paying ransoms
leads to the return of innocent civilians, but never having paid a ransom
at all will just as likely prevent citizens being abducted. But, “[w]hen
[terrorists] see that holding and negotiating for hostages is a slow, risky
and less likely to produce benefits, hostage-takers will think twice.” 128
However, it is crucial that “every country . . . adopt and implement a noransoms policy.” 129 Not only will the adoption of this recommendation
secure future generations of Western interests 130 in the Middle East as
terrorist organizations will be deprived of financial resources and
deteriorate, but it will bring countries back into compliance with
Resolutions 1904, 2133, and 2170. Adopting this Recommendation will
also foster intelligence and data sharing, promote an international
coalition against KFR, and establish adherence to the aforementioned
resolutions because there will be greater transparency, accountability,
and forthrightness. 131
126

Andrew Silke, Terrorists, Victims, and Society: Psycohological Perspectives on
Terrorism and its Consequences 33 (Andrew Silke ed., Terrorists, Victims, and Society
2003) (2003).
127
Id. at 251.
128
Lucas V.M. Bento, Preserving Negotiation Whilst Promoting Global Order: Should
We Bargain with Salt-Water Devils?, 19 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 285, 309 (2014).
129
See Carnegie Press Release, supra note 68.
130
Press Release, Foreign Secretary Supports UN Efforts Against Terrorism,
Condemns Ransom Payments to Terrorists (September 27, 2010), https://www.gov.uk/
government/speeches/foreign-secretary-supports-un-efforts-against-terrorism-condemnsransom-payments-to-terrorists.
131
But see Eric Rosand & Alistair Millar, Strengthening International Law and Global
Implementation 63 (David Cortright & George A. Lopez eds., Uniting Against Terror:
Cooperative Nonmilitary Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat 2007) (2007). “While
increased cooperation, if it materializes, might improve the situation somewhat, it will
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International Enforcement Mechanisms

In order to reduce the number of KFR incidents there needs to be
comprehensive enforcement measures of the UN resolutions that prohibit
the payment of ransoms. 132 It is incumbent upon the United States, as the
strongest state in the world, to take the lead and make demands to the
Security Council so as to empower them in enforcing their resolutions.
Violations of Security Council Resolutions have historically resulted
in economic sanctions on the violating states.133 This is theoretically an
option with respect to the countries making KFR ransom payments.
However, it is not the most desirable one in the context of a friendly
state; one that has violated a resolution in a non-violent and purposeful
manner. 134 Sanctions, as well as military force, serve as the most
coercive forms of intervention135 and not only fail to serve their deterrent
function based on the nature of the states’ violation, but will also
undermine and damage relations with those allied states. Furthermore,
sanctions are fraught with implementation difficulties, and as such, they
require a strong international coalition for their success136 and many
states will likely contest sanctions being utilized as a response to
violating resolutions prohibiting the payment of ransoms by identifying
them as a form of material support to terrorist organizations.
Furthermore, the purpose of Security Council Resolutions is primarily to
encourage participation, not to impose sanctions except in the most
pressing of circumstances. 137 Therefore, imposing sanctions on alliednot address the underlying problem of different staff bodies that are unaccountable to
each other with separate budgets, different leaders, and overlapping mandates.”
132
See Id.
133
See S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999). Under this Resolution,
any and all member states are free to add individuals, countries, and entities to the
sanction list.
134
See e.g., Terrorism and the UN, Boulden & Weiss, pg. 163 (2004). In 2002, Russia
claimed Georgia was not complying with Resolution 1373 and as a result threatened to
invoke its right of self-defense.
135
Id. at 158. The sanctions, however, would serve a deterrent effect to the countries
that are directly (although somewhat involuntarily contrary to voluntary state donors)
providing material support to terrorist organizations. Furthermore, imposing economic
sanctions on ally countries diverges from past sanctions imposed by the U.N. For
example, in 1992 the UN imposed economic sanctions on Libya because of its alleged
support in the bombing of an American airplane, killing 270 people. See Chantal de
Jonge Oudraat, Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Legal and Political Conundrums,”
Working Paper No. 15 August 2000, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Washington, D.C.
136
Id.
137
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cooperating countries is not only largely unheard of, but defies the
purpose of the Security Council as a global anti-terrorism heading
body. 138
A more practical alternative is the public denunciation of the masked
payments of European countries to terrorist organizations, thereby
increasing global pressure on paying countries to stop their
counterproductive policies. Increasing political pressure on our allied
countries is the least hostile yet effective means of changing their
masked payment policies. In fact, the U.N. has resorted to publicly
sanctioning violating states, referred to as “name and blame.” 139
For the UN Security Council to remain an effective tool in
combatting terrorist activities such as KFR, the U.S. needs to take the
lead and inject more financial and technical assistance to the Security
Council to facilitate the functioning of its duties.140

VIII.

CONCLUSION

Terrorism, and more specifically, KFR, remains one of the largest
threats to global security and peace in the 21st century. 141 The Security
Council considers terrorism and KFR to be the largest threat to
international peace. Without money, terrorists cannot terrorize. Bringing
an end to payment of ransoms will deprive terrorist organizations of an
essential lifeline—financial resources and political concessions in
exchange for an endless cache of potential hostages. In bringing an end
to the payment of ransoms to terrorist groups, there will be tough
considerations for countries to face, and there must be consideration of
what they are prepared to sacrifice in the present for the sake of
international security and peace in the future. This will undoubtedly raise
tough questions that will be the subject of harsh public criticism.
Nonetheless, they are considerations that must be made with a sense of
urgency. The urgency to do so is borne by the meteoric rise of KFR as a
terrorist financing mechanism; failure to enforce the pertinent Security
Council Resolutions has the ability to undercut longstanding
international policies in such a way that render the Resolutions

Threat 2007) (2007). Most member states and U.N. Counterterrorism Committee
(“CTC”) officials have been unwilling to go as far as impose “forceful sanctions.”
Rather, they prefer emphasizing encouragement and inducements to implement the
resolutions adopted by the Security Council.
138
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139
Id. at 46.
140
Id. at 41.
141
UK Resolution on Terrorist KFR, supra, note 11.
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meaningless all while putting innocent citizens of all Western
civilizations at risk, especially abroad.
Failure to effectively and steadfastly implement the anti-KFR
measures will also have the effect of further undermining the Security
Council Resolutions by diminishing the Security Councils credibility.
As member and non-member states who make forbidden and secretive
KFR payments continue to act with impunity, there will be less regard
for the restraint that the Resolutions impose upon them; essentially, it
would be as if the Resolutions did not exist.
Security Council Resolutions undoubtedly put a stop to these
practices, at least in theory. The lack of enforcement and compliance
with the aforementioned resolutions ostensibly achieves the goal of
ending ransom payments and political concessions. By restoring the
meaning to no concessions and adopting this Notes recommendation,
there will an end put to, and, at the very least, substantially frustrate, the
continuing viability of a condemned practice and promote a
comprehensive approach to terrorist organizations that will ultimately
teach that there is nothing to be gained by kidnapping innocent civilians
and putting a price on their head to fund their extremist agendas. This is
what the law requires and it is the right resultthe implementation and
enforcement of Resolutions 1904, 2133, and 2170 lies in the hands of the
global community, particularly United States and the United Kingdom.

